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Abstract 
The assessment of the usefulness of terrorist profiling is often conflated with an exaggerated 
presentation of the threat of terrorism as a basis to justify the use of terrorist profiling or an 
exaggerated impact of terrorist profiling as a basis to criticise its use by law enforcement 
officers. There is a considerable gap in the literature on terrorist profiling which fails to 
present a framework that can objectively engage in assessing/measuring the usefulness of 
terrorist profiling. The continued prevalence of terrorism continues to necessitate the existence 
of counterterrorism frameworks that allow law enforcement officers deploy pre-emptive 
control strategies. However, the difficulty posed by the existence of these strategies is whether 
they can actually be considered capable of assisting law enforcement officers detect, deter or 
prosecute those engaged in acts of terrorism or its associated preparatory activities. 
 
This paper proposes to address this gap by firstly examining previous attempts at analysing 
the usefulness of terrorist profiling and the different approaches more generally adopted to 
measure the usefulness of counter-terrorism strategies. This discussion is followed by a 
presentation of a workable framework that can be applied to different manifestations of 
terrorist profiling to begin considering its usefulness as a counterterrorist tool. This paper 
ultimately concludes that any assessment of terrorist profiling requires an assessment of the 
processes used to construct profiles separately from the assessment of the application of 
terrorist profiling in the field with a further layer of assessing considering its broader impact 
to question its overall usefulness as a counterterrorism tool.  
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Introduction 
The use of profiling as a counterterrorism tool has invoked considerable controversy as to 
whether it can ever be considered capable of assisting law enforcement officers detect, deter 
and prosecute those involved or likely to be involved in terrorism and/or its preparatory 
activities. The assessment of profiling raises complex issues as to what framework, if any, 
might be considered suitable to measure/test the utility of profiling as a counter-terrorism 
policing tool.  
 
The central exploratory aim of this paper is to identify a framework capable of 
assessing/measuring the utility of terrorist profiling.  The focus in this article is not on any one 
manifestation of terrorist profiling but rather it concreates on developing a system or analytical 
framework that can be applied to individual manifestations of terrorist profiling to assist in 
drawing conclusions about the likely utility of profiling.  A core argument advanced in this 
paper is that the usefulness of terrorist profiling can only be demonstrated where a 
manifestation of profiling is capable of identifying likely terrorist characteristics that allows 
law enforcement officers draw distinctions between those likely to be involved in terrorism 
and/or its preparatory activities, the general population of law breaking and the general 
population at large.   
 
This aim is pursued in three ways. The discussion begins firstly by presenting a working 
definition of terrorist profiling before secondly examining the weaknesses with the previous 
attempts at assessing the usefulness of terrorist profiling and counterterrorism strategies more 
broadly. Thirdly, the discussion then ultimately presents an objective framework that may be 
applied to individual manifestations of terrorist profiling so as to allow an assessment of the 
usefulness of terrorist profiling. 
A working definition of profiling 
Before embarking on analysing the previous attempts at measuring the usefulness of terrorist 
profiling, it is necessary to provide a definition at this juncture of ‘profiling’ to aid clarity 
throughout the paper. 
 
Profiling may be considered as being a process that allows the profiler to identify a sequence 
of commonalities from different sets of data so as to predict likely offender characteristics. 
(Snook, et al, 2007).  There is a lack of consensus in the literature as to the precise definition 
of profiling which sways between a narrow and a broad definitional approach. For the purposes 
of this paper, a broad definition of profiling is adopted so as to ensure that a significant array 
of profiling methods and approaches can be captured by any future use of the analytical 
framework proposed later in the paper. As a result, profiling is defined as being any technique 
or process that that seeks to allow law enforcement officers to identify probable offender 
characteristics. (Horvath, 2009).  
 
The term profiling has become interchangeable with the terms ‘offender profiling, criminal 
profiling, criminal personality profiling and psychological profiling’ as a label for profiling 
techniques. (Douglas, et al, 1986, p. 405).  Many methods use the same structure such as the 
analysis of crime scene evidence, victim reports and/or previous criminal records to identify 
common offender characteristics. The core differences lie in the abilities and the characteristics 
of the profiler and the use of the information by profilers to make predictions on likely offender 
characteristics. (Gendreau, et al, 2002). For example, some profiling methods may rely on 
forensic evidence to make predictions of likely characteristics, whilst other methods may use 
previous offending records to engage in statistical reasoning to identify commonalities to make 
predictions as to likely offender characteristics.  Douglas et al identify that there are commonly 
three phases of profiling in criminal justice including: ‘firstly, criminal investigation, secondly 
apprehension and thirdly prosecution’. (Douglas, et al, 1986, p. 404).    
 
Consequently, the use of any data by a profiler so as to make predictions about ‘likely offender 
characteristics can be considered some form of profiling’ that may occur during criminal 
investigation, apprehension or prosecution of offenders. (Douglas, et al, 1986, p. 404).   
 
Previous Limitations/Difficulties with Analytical Frameworks Assessing/Measuring 
Terrorist Profiling 
Previous assessments on the usefulness of terrorist profiling raises a dichotomy between 
portraying profiling as an essential tool to assist law enforcement officers detect and prevent 
acts of terrorism and an unnecessary and unlawful practice capable of creating and perpetuating 
stereotypes which disproportionately affect ethnic and racial minorities in addition to 
stigmatising individuals who may have been previously involved in criminality. (Rosen, 2004).  
 
For example, De Schutter and Ringleheim (2008), Moeckli (2005 & 2012), Goldson (2006), 
Parmar (2010), Ojanen (2010 & 2009) and Edley (2003) all examine the usefulness of terrorist 
profiling by conducting a legal assessment of the compatibility of terrorist profiling with 
various human rights standards and norms. Although human rights standards and norms may 
provide a basis to assess/measure the usefulness of terrorist profiling, an inherent limitation of 
this approach is that it frequently characterises terrorist profiling as being ineffective primarily 
on the basis of human rights norms and standards without undertaking a systematic 
identification, explanation or evaluation of the different profiling methods used to construct 
profiles. Further this literature does not specifically focus on the usefulness of these 
methodologies as a tool to assist law enforcement officers in identifying individuals engaged 
in terrorism and/or preparatory activities. 
 
Alternatively, terrorist profiling has also been evaluated by conducting a utilitarian assessment 
of its capacity to assist law enforcement officers in detecting and preventing acts of terrorism. 
(Coke, 2003).  This approach commonly characterises terrorist profiling as being useful on the 
basis of its necessity as part of counter-terrorism policy necessary to assist law enforcement 
officers to foil and intercept serious terrorist attacks prior to their commission. (Reddick, 2004). 
For example, a terrorist attack intercepted by law enforcement officers includes the attempted 
truck bombings in Singapore thought to have been targeting Singapore’s airport, financial and 
embassy districts. (Rogers, 2003).  However, this approach fails to identify the specific role 
fulfilled by terrorist profiling in comparison to other counter-terrorist measures in assisting law 
enforcement officers preventing and detecting terrorism. Any assessment of terrorist profiling 
which fails to identify the role played by terrorist profiling within counter-terrorism may be 
subject to the criticism that the assistive value of terrorist profiling may be over or under 
inflated in the prevention and detection of terrorism and as a result is unable to determine a 
realistic assessment/measurement of usefulness. 
 
The usefulness of terrorist profiling has also been assessed/measured on the strength of moral 
arguments. This approach commonly characterises terrorist profiling as being ineffective on 
basis of empirical evidence, which demonstrates a negative impact of terrorist profiling on 
ethnic minority communities. For example, Swiney (2006) demonstrates the negative impact 
of terrorist profiling on Arab and Muslim communities by drawing on empirical research 
conducted on a selection of Arab and Muslim communities across the US since the September 
11th 2001 attacks. This involved analysing empirical data collected from a range of Arab and 
Muslim community support centres across the US to identify common concerns in Arab and 
Muslim communities stemming from the use of terrorist profiling by law enforcement officers. 
This approach can also be considered limited as the assessment of usefulness is largely 
conducted on the basis of opinion canvassed from various communities as opposed to an 
enhanced investigation of the processes involved in constructing and applying terrorist profiles. 
 
The problem with these previous assessments of terrorist profiling is that they tend to either 
support or reject terrorist profiling without undertaking a systematic assessment of the profiling 
methodologies that distinguishes between the construction and application of profiles. There is 
a distinct lack of debate, discussion and analysis in the literature that provides an analytical 
framework to assess/measure the usefulness of terrorist profiling which is capable of 
characterising terrorist profiling as being effective, ineffective or harmful on the basis of 
analysing the process of constructing terrorist profiles separate from the application of terrorist 
profiles. It is contended that the characterisation of terrorist profiling as being effective, 
ineffective or harmful can only be done by developing an analytical framework that is capable 
of assessing/measuring the usefulness of the profiling methods used in the construction of 
terrorist profiles separately from the application of terrorist profiles by law enforcement 
officers, as this provides a basis for a methodical and systematic investigation of the usefulness 
of terrorist profiling. 
 
Research Approaches in Examining the Usefulness of Counter-Terrorism Policies 
In light of the limitations of the previous attempts at analysing the usefulness of terrorist 
profiling, it is now appropriate to progress further by examining previous approaches or 
frameworks adopted more generally in counter-terrorism to measure/assess usefulness. It is 
significant to note that the literature on counter-terrorism does not present a universally 
accepted framework or approach to assess/measure the usefulness of counter-terrorism policies. 
(van Dongen, 2011) Consequently, the development of an analytical framework capable of 
assessing/measuring the usefulness of terrorist profiling can be considered challenging.  Lum 
et al (2006, p. 510) argue that 
there has been a proliferation of anti-terrorism programs and 
policies as well as massive increases in expenditures towards 
combating terrorism. Yet we currently know almost nothing 
about the effectiveness of any of these programmes. 
 
Other academic commentators have also identified a significant gap in literature dealing with 
the issue of assessing/measuring the usefulness of counter-terrorism policies. (For example, 
van Dongen, 2011 Benmelech, et al, 2010 & Gold, 2005). 
 
Despite the inherent difficulty in assessing/measuring the usefulness of counter-terrorism, the 
literature presents two alternative approaches to assess/measure the usefulness of counter- 
terrorism policies. 
 
Firstly, a number of studies adopt quantitative approaches that concentrate on assessing the 
usefulness of counter-terrorism policies by employing statistical and mathematical techniques 
to demonstrate the impact of counter-terrorism policies. The quantitative approaches tend to 
assess/measure the usefulness of counter-terrorism policies by undertaking a utilitarian 
assessment of the results of specific counter-terrorism policies by analysing evidence of their 
capacity to curtail, disrupt or contain terrorism. 
 
Secondly, a number of studies alternatively adopt qualitative approaches which assess the 
usefulness of counter-terrorism policies both by undertaking a utilitarian assessment of 
counter-terrorism policies but also present a number of arguments as to the reasons why 
particular counter-terrorism policies can be considered more useful in comparison to other 
counter-terrorism policies. 
 
Quantitative Approaches in Assessing Usefulness 
The assessment/measurement of usefulness in quantitative approaches commonly 
demonstrates effectiveness by concentrating on identifying the end result of the use of counter-
terrorism policies. This means that quantitative approaches commonly characterise counter-
terrorism policies as being useful if the study can demonstrate some evidence of success of the 
counter-terrorism policy’s capacity to interfere, deter or prevent acts of terrorism. In essence, 
this approach can be considered similar to a utilitarian assessment of effectiveness. For 
example: Cauley and Im (1998) and Landes (1978) examined the usefulness of metal detectors 
and intervention policies used at airport and embassies to enhance security screening; 
Makovsky (2004) examined the usefulness of protecting terrorism sensitive buildings and 
installations through increased defence fortification measures; Enders and Sandler (1993) 
examined the usefulness of criminalising terrorism activities through anti-terrorism laws; 
Zussmann and Zussmann (2006) and Plaw (2008) examined the usefulness of ‘targeted 
assassination’ of ‘known’ terrorists; Dugan et al (2009) examined the usefulness of 
containment and curfew policies; and Testas (2004) examined the usefulness of the use of 
aggressive military retaliation policies as part of counter-terrorism policies. 
 
An identifiable theme in these studies is that they engage in an assessment of usefulness by 
adopting a time series analysis of the individual counter-terrorism policy under investigation 
against the occurrence of terrorism so as to measure the impact of the individual counter-
terrorism policy. They tend to define the effectiveness of individual counter-terrorism policies 
by identifying indicators of success by reference to the stated aim of a particular counter-
terrorism policy.  This typically involves examining the impact of a policy in counteracting or 
minimising the risk of a known terrorism threat in isolation from other threats and other 
counter-terrorist policies over a period of time. As a result, this approach is a results driven 
assessment/measurement of usefulness. 
 
A classic example can be considered Cauley and Im (1998) who examined the usefulness of 
metal detectors and other intervention counter-terrorism policies including enhanced security 
measures at embassies in counteracting the threat terrorism at airports and embassies from the 
1950s to the 1970s. This involved adopting a time series analysis so as to plot the number of 
terrorist incidents at airports in the US and at embassies so as to demonstrate the impact of 
these intervention counter-terrorist policies in being able to manage the threat of terrorism. By 
mapping out the frequency and the occurrence of terrorism incidences and the introduction of 
intervention counter-terrorism policies the study was able to identify statistics which illustrated 
a fall in the occurrence of terrorism as a consequence of the intervention counter-terrorism 
policies. 
 
Although these attempts at assessing/measuring the usefulness of terrorist profiling may be 
considered a valuable basis to characterise the usefulness of counter-terrorism policies, they 
ultimately fail to identify the value of any particular policy in assisting law enforcement 
officers in managing the threat of terrorism. The use of quantitative approaches to assess the 
usefulness of counter-terrorism raise at least three core weaknesses. 
 
Quantitative research approaches tend to evaluate the usefulness of individual terrorist policies 
in isolation which fails to appreciate that law enforcement officers rarely employ counter- 
terrorism policies in isolation or singly. Therefore, caution must be exercised in relying 
exclusively on quantitative research approaches to assess the usefulness of counter-terrorism 
policies as this approach could over or under inflate the role of the policy under investigation 
in the prevention and detection of terrorism. 
 
Additionally, quantitative approaches carry the innate potential to assume that the capabilities 
of terrorist groups remain static over time. It is submitted that relying exclusively on 
quantitative research approaches requires caution not to over or under estimate the changing 
capabilities of terrorist groups and individuals. 
 
Finally, any approach used to assess/measure usefulness which concentrates almost entirely 
upon the results of a counter-terrorism policy can be considered as being a very narrow 
assessment/measurement of usefulness as it fails entirely to consider the broader implications 
and consequences of using that policy to manage the threat of terrorism. 
 
Qualitative Approaches in Assessing Usefulness 
Other studies evaluating counter-terrorism regimes, such as those carried out by Charter (1994), 
Schmid and Crelinsten (1993), Art and Richardson (2007) and Cronin (2009) adopted 
qualitative approaches as a basis to identify the usefulness of individual policies within 
counter-terrorism regimes. The qualitative approach commonly seeks to evaluate the 
usefulness of counter-terrorism policies by adopting a two-stage analysis of counter-terrorism 
policies. Firstly, a broad investigation is commonly conducted of the counter-terrorism policy 
under investigation, and secondly a further study is conducted to hypothesise the factors 
governing the usefulness of that counter-terrorism policy. 
 
For example, Schmid and Crelinsten (1993) conduct an investigation into a broad range of 
counter-terrorism responses where they characterise counter-terrorism responses as either 
being ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ depending on the nature of the counter-terrorism response. After Schmid 
and Crelinsten (1993) develop their characterisation theory on counter-terrorism responses 
they further investigate whether their theory can be demonstrated by analysing the operation 
of different counter-terrorism responses in practice. In essence, Schmid and Crelinsten’s 
investigation assesses the usefulness of counter-terrorism responses by firstly developing a 
theory on counter-terrorism policies and secondly progresses to examine the frequency of the 
occurrence of their theory in practice so that they are able to draw conclusions as to the factors 
that influence the usefulness of different counter-terrorism responses. 
 
Therefore, qualitative approaches used to assess/measure the usefulness of counter-terrorism 
seeks to evaluate usefulness by not only concentrating on the results and capacity of counter- 
terrorism to manage the threat of terrorism but also seek to analyse the broader implications of 
using particular counter-terrorism policies. However, all of the qualitative studies, similar to 
the quantitative studies, can be subject to criticism for failing to identify explicitly the role of 
individual counter-terrorism policies as being effective in assisting in managing the threat of 
terrorism. For example, Schmid and Crelinsten’s (1993) study was ultimately incapable of 
characterising individual counter-terrorist responses as being effective, but rather was only 
capable of examining counter-terrorism responses as a whole. Despite this limitation, it is 
contended that qualitative approaches used to assess/measure usefulness may demonstrate a 
stronger basis to characterise any counter-terrorism policy as being effective, ineffective or 
harmful as it undertakes a broader assessment of not only the results of counter-terrorism 
policies but also assists in interpreting the results of counter-terrorism policies. 
 
Summary of Qualitative and Quantitative Research Approaches 
The limitations of quantitative and qualitative approaches demonstrate that 
assessing/measuring the usefulness of counter-terrorism policies may be open to criticism on 
the basis that it can be considered challenging to examine single counter-terrorist policies in 
isolation. The challenge is due to the specific nature of counter-terrorism generally operating 
as a concert of policies in harmony to ‘manage’ the threat of terrorism. However, the mere fact 
that it can be considered challenging or limited does not invalidate the conclusions drawn in 
either the quantitative or qualitative studies, but rather this is a weakness that is attributable to 
the nature of counter-terrorism as opposed to the individual approaches. In particular, it is 
contended that these studies demonstrate that in developing an analytical framework to 
assess/measure the usefulness of terrorist profiling it is necessary to not only evaluate 
usefulness by the results of terrorist profiling but also part of the assessment/measurement of 
usefulness must include the broader impact and consequences of using terrorist profiling to 
assist in managing the threat of terrorism. 
 
Although all of the studies investigating the usefulness of counter-terrorism policies may be 
subjected to criticism, the basis upon which the studies were conducted can be considered 
relevant in assisting with the creation of an analytical framework capable of 
assessing/measuring the usefulness of terrorist profiling. 
 
In particular, it is significant to note that adopting purely quantitative approaches to assess the 
usefulness of terrorist profiling can be considered as being limited as it would fail to appreciate 
the broader implications of other counter-terrorism policies which are interdependent on the 
usefulness of terrorist profiling as a counter-terrorist policy. Therefore, any assessment of the 
usefulness of terrorist profiling must be conducted by using qualitative approaches in addition 
to quantitative approaches as a basis to evaluate usefulness as it provides a broader basis to 
assess/measure the usefulness of the construction and application of terrorist profiles by law 
enforcement officers. It is contended that by using quantitative and qualitative approaches at 
different stages in the assessment/measurement of usefulness, it creates a strong basis to 
characterise terrorist profiling as being effective, ineffective or harmful. 
 
An Analytical Framework to Assess/Measure the Usefulness of Terrorist Profiling 
The lack of coherence and consensus in the literature on the measurement/assessment of the 
usefulness of counter-terrorism policies demonstrates that it may be considered difficult to 
develop an analytical framework agreeable by many to examine the thorny issue as to how to 
measure/assess usefulness. Despite this difficulty, Van Um and Pisoiu (2011) present a helpful 
framework capable of assessing/measuring the usefulness of counter-terrorism policies by 
assessing the ‘output, outcome and impact effectiveness’ of the counter-terrorism policies 
through a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches.  
 
The ‘output’ can be defined as an assessment of the counter-terrorism measure; the ‘outcome’ 
can be defined as an assessment of the use of the counter-terrorism measure in managing the 
threat of terrorism, whereas the ‘impact’ can be defined as an assessment of the long-term 
consequences of the counter-terrorism measure. In the context of terrorist profiling the 
assessment of the ‘output’ involves analysing the construction of terrorist profiles, the 
assessment of the ‘outcome’ involving analysing the application of terrorist profiles and the 
assessment of the ‘impact’ involves examining the evidence of the long term impact on society 
of use of terrorist profiling in assisting in preventing and detecting terrorism. 
 
Although the terminology used by van Um and Pisoiu (2011) may be considered somewhat 
confusing and unnecessarily complex, the important point demonstrated from their framework 
is that in order to assess/measure the usefulness of a counter-terrorism measure it is necessary 
to undertake an examination of more than simply a utilitarian assessment of a counter-terrorism 
measure. 
 
Consequently, the analytical framework below involves the assessment of terrorist profiling by 
concentrating on assessing/measuring effectiveness in three stages, which begins to address 
some of the inherent weaknesses of the previous attempts at evaluating the usefulness of 
terrorist profiling as discussed at the start of this paper. 
 
Output Effectiveness – Construction of Terrorist Profiles 
The first stage, the ‘output effectiveness’ assessment, involves concentrating on assessing how 
the counter-terrorism measure is constructed. Although ‘output effectiveness’ may be 
considered a useful label, this paper changes this terminology to ‘input effectiveness’ or the 
‘independent variables’ that draw up the outputs of a terrorist profiling activity.  This is due to 
the fact that at this first stage the entire approach is based on the inputting of data so as to 
construct profiles.  In the context of terrorist profiling, it is contended that the assessment of 
the measure must begin by analysing the construction of a terrorist profile by focusing on 
analysing the profiling methods. This first stage in assessing/measuring usefulness can be 
largely considered a utilitarian assessment of terrorist profiling as it seeks to establish whether 
the profiling methods are capable of identifying likely terrorist characteristics. 
 
A methodological assessment of the terrorist profiling can only be conducted in light of other 
more established criminal profiling methods. An assessment of the established criminal 
profiling methods, such as deductive and inductive profiling methodologies, may provide the 
first means of assessing/measuring the usefulness of terrorist profiling methodologies. It is 
contended that this first stage in assessing/measuring the usefulness of terrorist profiling could 
allow for conclusions to be drawn as to whether terrorist profiling is at minimum capable of 
identifying individuals likely to be engaged in terrorism or preparatory activities. 
 
Outcome Effectiveness – Application of Terrorist Profiles 
The second stage, the ‘outcome effectiveness’ assessment, involves assessing the use of the 
counter-terrorism measure in managing the threat of terrorism. Similar to the previous section, 
in order to use a label that more accurately reflects the nature of the assessment of profiling at 
this second stage of the terrorist profiling activity, the discussion throughout this paper refers 
to this stage as being the ‘output effectiveness’ or the ‘dependent variable’ that is dependent 
on the inputs at the previous stage in the terrorist profiling activity.  This is due to the fact that 
this second stage is entirely focused on assessing the application of the constructed profiles by 
law enforcement officers.  
 
This could involve considering factors such as arrests, prosecutions and investigations 
conducted as a result of the individuals identified by the application of terrorist profiles.  The 
assessment of the application of terrorist profiles will primarily involve an empirical 
assessment of the application of terrorist profiles. This assessment would need to use 
quantitative research approaches to identify patterns and trends in the information whereas 
qualitative research approaches would be required to analyse any patterns or trends identified. 
 
The assessment of terrorist profiling by examining the construction of terrorist profiles 
separately from the application of terrorist profiles by law enforcement officers can be 
considered a useful basis to characterise the usefulness of terrorist profiling as it seeks to 
assess/measure usefulness by focusing on the capability of terrorist profiling to produce results. 
 
Undoubtedly, part of the assessment/measurement of the usefulness of terrorist profiling should 
involve an assessment as to whether terrorist profiling can actually work through an analysis 
of the construction and application of terrorist profiles. However, any analytical framework 
which purely assesses/measures usefulness by concentrating on its results can be considered as 
undertaking a narrow measurement/assessment of usefulness. A parallel may be drawn here to 
the discussion above on quantitative approaches, which criticised any assessment/measurement 
of usefulness purely on results as it denied a broader assessment/measurement of usefulness. 
 
Therefore, any assessment/measurement of the usefulness of terrorist profiling through an 
examination of the profiling methods used in the construction of profiles and the application 
of profiles by law enforcement officers may be subject to the criticism that this approach fails 
to appreciate the broader consequences of terrorist profiling stemming from the use of terrorist 
profiling in the prevention and detection of terrorism. It is contended it is necessary to evaluate 
the usefulness of terrorist profiling by progressing to the third stage in order to characterise 
terrorist profiling as being ‘effective, ineffective or harmful’. (Lum and Kennedy, 2012, pp. 3-
4). 
 
Impact Effectiveness – The Consequences of Terrorist Profiling 
The final stage, ‘the impact effectiveness’ assessment involves examining the long-term impact 
by identifying the consequences of terrorist profiling as a counterterrorism tool. The previous 
two stages will be able to show, within a reasonable degree of probability, whether the various 
manifestations of terrorist profiling may be likely to work in theory and practice. However, in 
light of the very serious nature of terrorist profiling, it is argued that a narrow assessment of 
terrorist profiling by simply asking whether it works would fail to appreciate the broader 
consequences of using terrorist profiling which may be considered as eroding its usefulness as 
a counterterrorism policing tool. 
 
As a result, it is contended that any assessment of the usefulness of terrorist profiling must 
question whether its long term consequences can be considered as being harmful and perhaps 
counterproductive to deterring, detecting and prosecuting those engaged in terrorism acts or its 
preparatory activities. At this stage in assessing/measuring the usefulness of an individual 
manifestation of terrorist profiling, it would be useful to consider other factors here that may 
have an impact on the assessment, such as considering the broader environment in which 
terrorism operates.   
 
The purpose of the impact assessment is to question whether the cost and/or associated cost of 
terrorist profiling is likely to be considered as outweighing its perceived usefulness. It is 
acknowledged that in some cases, the assessment of the impact of terrorist profiling may be 
tentative which is due to inconclusive available evidence in the public domain. However, the 
discussion on impact should generally be able to discern whether the cost of an individual 
terrorist profiling scheme could be considered as eroding the state’s moral authority to govern 
to the point that the cost of profiling is too much to pay in light of the danger it poses to 
fundamental human rights and democratic values in society. 
 
Although it is accepted that the state has a right to adopt laws and policies to achieve its 
‘security’, Teson’s (2005) argument is also accepted that security in of itself cannot be viewed 
as being the end at the cost of fundamental human rights. Furthermore, if security 
becomes/remains the state’s end focus then the continual denial of human rights will mean that 
the state begins to operate in the same field as the terrorists. This will create injustice and 
perceived injustice that will inevitably question the overall usefulness of terrorist profiling as 
a counterterrorism tool, which may be considered as denying the state its legitimacy to govern. 
 
A further issue on assessing impact involves examining the lawfulness of including sensitive 
characteristics such as race, ethnicity, gender, religion etc in any form of profiling. The use of 
any terrorist profiling scheme will inevitably involve tensions between the protection of 
fundamental human rights and the need for security. However, from a legal perspective it is 
contended that any assessment on usefulness will need to be able to pinpoint the precise 
boundaries of acceptable (if any) forms of terrorist profiling. 
 
Conclusion: Measuring Usefulness 
The primary aim of the discussion in this paper was to present a framework capable of 
assessing/measuring the usefulness of individual manifestations of terrorist profiling schemes. 
Previous attempts at analysing the usefulness of terrorist profiling fall significantly short on 
engaging in a systematic analysis of the construction, application and impact of terrorist 
profiling. This creates a considerable gap in the literature as to how the usefulness of terrorist 
profiling might or should be undertaken. 
 
In attempting to fill this gap, the discussion above contended that any systematic assessment 
of terrorist profiling requires separate analysis of the processes used to construct profiles versus 
the processes used to apply process. This provides a strong methodological basis to begin 
understanding the deficiencies and weaknesses (if any) that may exist in individual terrorist 
profiling schemes. However, it is also argued that a further layer of analysis that focuses on 
discerning the impact of terrorist profiling is required in order to determine an accurate 
assessment of the likely usefulness of terrorist profiling. 
 
Therefore, it is argued that one framework that may be capable of conducting a systematic 
assessment of the usefulness of terrorist profiling is to engage in analysing the likely input 
effectiveness, output effectiveness and the impact effectiveness of each individual 
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